
WHY INFORMATION PHILOSOPHY BASED ON COMPUTATIONAL ONTOLOGY FAILED TO COMPLETE THE INFORMATION TURN

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Abstract: Floridi proposes an informational turn in philosophy, arguing that such a turn would revolutionise the overall way in which problems are dealt with in old and new philosophies and bring about substantial innovations in philosophical systems. However, Floridi attempts to propose an information ontology on analytic philosophical principles, and the resulting Kantian regression can only exacerbate the conflicting elements of agnosticism and metaphysics, and subsequently it causes the uncertainty of the information being so that the essence of being should concede to computing, towards a computational ontology. This turn does not seem to be complete, and does not give a transformative solution to the old and new problems of philosophy. Although this turn is still a positive attempt to save the metaphysics lost under digital ontology. But Floridi fails to realise that simply adding information to structural positivism, while still following the original core of structural realism, will not create a new information theory of ontology, as its focus is still on structural realism and not on information.

Keywords: The Information Turn; Computational ontology; Information ontology.

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Introduction

In recent years, the idea that philosophy will undergo an information turn has been put forward by K. Wu [Wu, K, 2014] and Floridi [Floridi, 2011] under

different paradigms of information philosophy, respectively. And Floridi inappropriately equated information ontology, which is the root of the information philosophy paradigm, with computational ontology, so that he was unable to present a strong support for the argument that philosophy will make an information turn at the ontology level. The argument in this paper will also be developed in terms of both the foundations of Floridi's computational ontology and the dilemma of realising the information turn.

Why it's a kind of computational ontology

Although information ontology is the core of Floridian information philosophy, the explanatory kernel of information ontology and the method of its construction are more fundamentally computational in nature, or rather Computational is the first element that makes this information philosophy possible. This paper proposes that Floridian's attitude towards information turn is more precisely based on the Computational path. The main reason is that the computational concession of the right of access to open definitions of information makes information structural realism actually a Computational ontology.

The origins of Computational ontology should go back to Alan Turing's question, "can machines think[Turing, A, 1950]", and the derived question "Are humans computers?" This dual question led to the computer revolution in philosophy [Sloman, 1978], i.e., the rise of the philosophy of artificial intelligence. The philosophy of AI, with information-computationalism as its main program, is generally based on a return to Pythagorean digital ontology, which holds that existence is based on algorithms operating according to rules [Schmidhuber,1997]. Digital ontology is the original form of Computational ontology, which, because it generalizes material existence to existence itself, can only propose a retrospective consideration of the Pythagorean digital ontology that is the ultimate of the discrete indivisible is actually a computable digital entity [Floridi, 2011]. Floridi theorizes this philosophy of AI as an immature paradigm for the philosophy of information [Floridi, 2002]. Or rather Floridi wants to establish a new paradigm for the philosophy of information that will make the philosophical study of information as an interdisciplinary

instrumental character dissolve in the philosophical view of AI and form a paradigm for the philosophy of information with a mixture of cross-disciplinary elements. So he needs to do what he does with the theory of the ontology of information on the. So what he needs to do is to replace digital ontology with information theorizes, but it is hard to say that it is complete, because the firstness of information ontology in information structure positivism is shared with Computational ontology, and even dependent on Computational ontology, although Floridi tries to confuse the existential status of computing through the vocabulary such as "data + queries [Floridi, 2011]", which seems to be irrelevant to computing, but when a precise explanation of "data" is needed, he makes the specification of data as a domain of coordinates under a binary distinction [Floridi, 2011]. It has been argued that this binary discrete distinction of information would return to the digital ontology, since the information realization of physical existence continues to originate in bits [Long, 2020]. Though this is undoubtedly a misinterpretation of Floridi, since the digital ontology is the dissolution of existence into being things themselves, a kind of existential cancellation, whereby existence is only, as Nietzsche puts it, the existence of being things, and not of that which exists in truth [Heidegger, 2015], i.e., existence resides only in the manifested being things and not in existence itself, with an anti-metaphysical character. Floridi's use of binary bits as a basis for data interpretation can only lead to the need for information ontology to be based on Computational ontology, which would no longer be a digital entity, i.e., the question of existence remains a metaphysical question for Floridi.

It is not difficult to find that Floridi realized that it is impossible to give a standardized definition of information to satisfy the discussion of information problems in multiple disciplines [Floridi, 2004], so information is put into the category of an open definition, so the information structural realism also turns the metaphysical problem into an open realm, the existence of the information is fluid, so that information dynamics can be interpreted according to the information structure. The most important problem in this logic is that the use of "information" in each discipline is already based on a definition of information, and we can't respond to this definition from the top down with the existence of

information, and if we force an explanation, we will inevitably put metaphysics in the trap of instrumentalism. Floridi cannot thoroughly argue for information as a structural object in eliminativist structural realism, because the stipulation of information retreats into the digital ontology of the bit entity, which in turn fails to respond to the substance of metaphysics. That is, there is no escape from the digital ontological limitations of using data bits to define information if information is at the center of this ontology; there is no way to respond to the synthesis of interdisciplinary information application scenarios if information is at the center of metaphysics.

What Floridi has missed is that what he considers to be the most important processual element of the philosophical construction of information, i.e., computing [Floridi, 2002] is instead the key to this ontology. More precisely, the right that information can be openly defined lies in computing. For if the information kernel of the structural realism of information is dynamic, then the structure that enables it to hold is itself existentially foundational, and this structure consists of being built on the binary discrete distinction and non-reduction data relations defined by the data, i.e., on the kernel of computing that deals with such situations. So retreating to the structural realism of structural existence, i.e. to the structural possibilities of the real object as the real object itself, can instead enable the realization of this ontological paradigm. So it can be concluded that the only possibility for the definition of information openness to be carried out is Computational ontology, and the basis for the existence of information objects is also Computational ontology, so Floridi's structural realism of information is in fact a kind of Computational ontology.

The possibility of the realization of information turn

For Floridi's starting point, which undoubtedly has the vestige of analytic philosophy, and he considers the possibility of the information turn as an extended elaboration of the linguistic turn according to Damiette [Floridi, 2002], or that the linguistic turn is the original form of the information turn. This needs to be based on the presupposition that the linguistic turn is a way of attributing ontological categories to the means of organisation or management of the problem of information that we face, it deems that the ontological significance

of language lies in being a tool for analysing semantic information. This way of distinguishing two questions of existence comes from Quine, the first of which is language-based, the existence of what is said to exist in some statement or doctrine of ours or others, the second is about the existence of what is itself.[Quine, 2011] Analytic philosophy allows ontology to dwell only on the first question, what makes existence possible in our analyses, when the question should be directed to what that something is exists in itself.

So Floridi considers that since analytic philosophy takes tools to be the basis of ontology, then turning to that which is analysed by tools returns the question to the original roots of ontology, and since the object of analysis lies in semantic information, what is possible for existence to be is also based on information. But it also leads to two questions, first is whether the existence of analysis is existence itself, that is, if analytic philosophy does focus on what we can say, then the legitimacy of the object of its analysis as existence itself lacks support, because even analytic philosophy doesn't say what that existence as existence is, but only what we can describe. Therefore, the essence of information as an element analysed by language cannot be derived from the logic of analysis, that is, the correlation between information and existence can only be a synthetic proposition rather than an analytical proposition. Secondly, if the semantic information is used as the basic information concept for analysing information [Floridi, 2009], the ontological basis of information will be weak because the semantic information has already presupposed a meaning for the information, and then this meaning comes from the subject's experience rather than an objective information existence itself. The logic of ontology is a kind of top-down foundational and cannot be based on empirical inverse method, which would only put the situation back into the Hume's quagmire.

Floridi desires to establish a kind of metaphysics of information that can return to existence itself with requiring a break of the framework of analytic philosophy, which must look for that being behind the analysis rather than the existence of the analysis. And Floridi bases his solution on a return to Kant, i.e. if there really is an unknowable being itself, then it cannot be analysed as Kant's thing-in-itself, and we can only analyse the existence as we know it. Floridi argues that whether we are confronted with the existence of analysable semantics or that

unanalysable being itself, it is based on the fact that information being, and so information has the ontological primacy. And it leads to a new problem, that Kant has thought that thing-in-itself is being and unknowable, so we should avoid discussing it, but Floridi thinks that information being since it cannot be known, so how can one be sure that existence is information being. This seems to be a dogmatism definition that presupposes that being is based on information, and then goes on to discuss what makes it possible to know information, and what extent it is possible to know it.

Conclusion

The structural realism of information that constructs the foundation of information being does not even make an essential break to the metaphysics of Strawson's account, i.e., it cannot arrive at a plausible explanation of the argument for the acquisition of beliefs, but can only show that it is consistent with the conceptual schema that we have taken, and show how it mirrors the structure of that schema. [Peter, 2004] Since the only thing we can say in the information structural realism is that the data base and the network relations of the data, i.e., the computational relations of information, the cession of information ontology to Computational ontology is a kind of passive abortion rather than a proper attribution. So what is the ontological basis on which the nature of information needs to be based can only be reduced to the open metaphysical possibilities, because the exact tracing of the metaphysical nature of information is missing a logically sound argumentative foundation, so it does not seem to be an expansive development of metaphysical possibilities, but rather a metaphysical degradation, is a metaphysical escape from what should be a metaphysical question that is undiscussable.

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Major Fields of Scientific Research: General theoretical information research.